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1. INTRODUCTION
After the euro banknotes and coins introduction in 2002, there was, among the consumers of the 
European countries, a widespread feeling of an increase of prices due to the new currency, despite 
the fact that the inflation rate registered by the official statistics didn't show any particular change. 
The gap between the consumer's perceptions and the real data went on for a significant period in 
most countries, and as regards Italy it started to diminish only two years later, indelibly marking the 
memory of the citizens. In fact, from then on, it's a common opinion, among the Italians consumers,
that the prices have been converted with an exchange rate of 1000 lire for one euro, namely 
doubling the prices of goods and services compared to the salaries that had converted with a rate of 
1936 lire for one euro.
This feeling was associated to the new currency and to the opportunism of the sellers that had 
presumably taken advantage of the low transparency of the new prices after the changeover,  
rounding up and rising the prices. In addition to it, also the media spread these feelings among the 
population, feeding the discussion and the importance of the topic in the daily life of the consumers.
Indeed, they highlighted the price increases occurred, reported the demonstration of the consumers' 
unions, and also disclosed the opinions of some non-official institutions claiming to have the 
explanation of the consumers' perception, instilling a sense of distrust about the official indices.
The increase in the perceived prices it's not only an interesting phenomenon but creates many 
problems in the economy itself. It is closely linked with the sense of purchasing power of the 
consumers, and then their perceived wealth, it affects the allocation of the resources confusing the 
reference prices of the various products and services, and in addition to it, it influences the wage 
negotiation and the labor market dynamics. Eventually, in this particular event, the rise of the 
perceived price could have nicked the European institutions and the public acceptance of their 
power and influence.
In this work, we will treat the major points of this topic. We will present the analysis of the actual 
and perceived inflation's data, and after that, we will see some of the reasons most cited in the 
literature that could be the cause of the perceptions, including: the possibility that the consumers 
rely on the price changes of the more frequently purchased products and overlook the impact of the 
more occasional purchasing, the possibility that they look more to the major changes among the 
different prices, that they are affected in a greater measure by the increases because of the loss 
aversion's role, and that the influence of the media could have distorted the consumer's perceptions.
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In addition to them, it is proposed a model that tries to explain the consumers' perceptions with 
another cognitive error, for which the persons tend to confirm their own prior belief ignoring the 
proof that can debunk them. It is called confirmation bias, and we will treat how the consumers that 
approach the euro introduction with an expectation and with the willing to verify it, could fall in 
such error. Thanks to the hypothesis test framework, we will see how the confirmation bias could 
come from the ambiguity confirmation of the prices close the expectation. And then, we will see the
effects on the perceptions of each element of the model by mean of comparative analysis, showing 
that, depending on the variables, the consumers could perceive an higher inflation than the real one, 
and that such phenomenon can last for a long period of time.
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2. INFLATION IN ITALY AROUND THE EURO CHANGEOVER
In this chapter, we will analyze the inflation by means of the Eurostat data, in order to see if there
was an increase in the prices. We will see the changes in the annual indices, on the monthly indices,
and some of the major product's price changes occurred at the time of the changeover. Moreover,
we will talk about the subjectivity of the inflation suffered by the consumers as well as few reasons
that brought the consumers' associations to sustain that the consumers experienced a higher inflation
rate than the one reported by the official data. 
We can see the price changes in Italy in figure 1, where is represented the Eurostat data relative to
the measures of HICP index (Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices, the index usually used to
compare the inflation of different European countries), for the period 1996-2007. Here, we can see
that  there are  not any doubling of  prices  around 2002, concurrently with the euro changeover.
Nevertheless, there is a slightly increase of the inflation rate in 2002 (between the 2001 and 2002
there is an increase of 0.3% of inflation rate), but it's not so relevant when compared to the changes
of the other years.
Figure 1: Annual Inflation rate (HICP) for Italy
Source: Eurostat
Even if we consider that the increase of inflation rate between 2001 and 2003 it's due only to the
euro's impact, we are talking about variations in the region of 0,5%, very light also compared with
the variability of the whole period. Given these data, it would be more suspicious if the euro had
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been introduced in 1999, seeing the 1% gap between 1999 and 2000. In such case, it'd be present at
least an interesting coincidence with the single currency introduction. 
Anyway, it's not visible a clear impact of the euro on inflation in these data. Even if it's possible
that the euro has had an impact since its placing on the financial market in 1999, and that such
impact took place in a longer period of time as could be 1999-2004. 
Even if we see through the magnifying glass the moment of the changeover, with the monthly data
visible in figure 2, we don't observe any abnormal change. According to these data, in January 2002
there is a downward trend that finds the minimum in the February of the same year, exactly at the
moment where it's suppose to be the maximum inflationary impact of the euro. Obviously, we can
imagine that the euro starts to exert his inflationary effects after the period where the consumers
could still use the old currency, which ended in the March 2002. In such case, we may have a match
from the data,  that shows a peak in that month.  However,  the increase in question is  probably
attributable to the seasonal trend of inflation, rather than the euro changeover, given that similar
moves recur with a certain frequency in the time series. In particular, the minimum of February is
probably  caused  by  the  post-Christmas  discounts  and  other  seasonal  depreciations,  and
consequently, the increased inflation in March would correspond to the end of the discount period.
All  of this  highlights the absence of  an abnormal increase of inflation rate  either  in  the two-
currencies period or immediately after.
Figure 2: Monthly Inflation rate (HICP) for Italy
Source: Eurostat
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A consideration that must be done is that being the inflation index an average of different price
changes, it's possible that the price of some goods went up while the price of others decreased. In
such situation it's possible that there are large prices increases, that are not visible in the aggregate
picture because compensated by decreases of other prices. Then, if we have that there are some
segments of consumer that are more interested to purchase a certain product than others,  these
segments would suffer a greater increase if the price of the product they are interest in increase. For
instance, all the low-income consumers are more affected by the changes in the food products and
renting than do higher-income consumers. If these and other particular kinds of goods have really
gone through a price increase, then stands to reason that the complaints of consumers came from
such increases rather than a general price increase.
Having said that, we can see from figure 3 the product categories that have endured the larger
monthly changes in the years 2002 and 2003. Here we have that, a few products have experienced
significant increases during 2002, which could be caused by the inflationary impact of the euro.
Even if, these increases of prices don't get close to the phantom doubling of prices claimed by the
consumers and neither leave room for the 30% stated by some consumer's association, the table
shows how there are some products that suffered large increases and, then, the possibility that the
consumers that used to buy more of these products could have suffered the inflation more than
others.
Among the  many products  in  the  table,  a  category more  significant  than  the  others  is  "fresh
vegetables", indeed this category suffers a data elaboration that attenuates the extreme values and
could underestimate the inflation rate.  Under this  circumstances could be partially justified the
worries of the consumers, given that this category is one of the most criticized. Seeing closer, the
increases of the fresh vegetables and fruits find a possible explanation by the fact that 2001 was a
singular year as regards the climatic conditions, that has resulted in a poor harvest. And then, the
prices may be increased as consequence of the supply fall. On the other hand, it's still possible that
some shopkeeper has exploited the currency changeover and the climatic conditions as an excuse to
raise prices. The vegetables and fruits' price increases is, also, one of the reasons why the estimates
of the consumers association, that are more based on the food's price, was so much different from
the official one. According to Eurispes, one of the most important critics of the Italian official data,
the increase of the food's price was closer to 8-9% in 2002, at odds with 2,6% of the official index. 
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Figure 3: Extreme price changes: 207-item breakdown
Source: Elaboration of Istat data by P. Del Giovane and R. Sabbatini,"The Introduction of the euro and the divergence
between officially measured and perceived inflation: the case of Italy", Bank of Italy, 2005
If we consider the Italian official index that aims to the evaluation of the working class' basket
changes  (the  FOI  index),  looking  for  some  confirmation  that  the  increases  affected  more  the
medium and low-income classes, we don't see much difference from the other indices (NIC, HICP).
Specifically, the FOI index (figure 4) indicates an increase of prices of 0,1-0,2% higher than HICP
in 2002, confirming that, in some way, the low-income consumers suffered more price inflation than
the others, but not so much to explain the perceptions. 
If we analyze the data of the different sectors all over the euro countries, we see that some of them,
in  particular  in  the  services  sector,  actually  suffered  an  increase  of  prices  at  the  time  of  the
changeover. For example, the sectors of “Hairdressing salons and personal care establishments”, the
“Cultural services” and the restaurants, suffered price increases larger than the same sectors in the
European countries that didn't join to the euro-zone (M. G. Ercolani and J. Dutta 2006). But, we
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have no way to verify that these increases are caused by the euro introduction, and neither that was
these increases to influence the consumers' perceptions.
In conclusion, the data don't show a particular increase in the inflation rate at  the time of the
changeover. There was, as every year, some product whose price increased and others whose price
decreased, and at that time of the changeover, there was particular increases of vegetables and fruits
prices and also in a few services sectors. So, as regards these sectors, it's  still  possible that the
increases  are  due to  the euro effects  and that  they have been hidden by the aggregate data  of
inflation, but we are far to any evidence of it.
Figure 4: Differences between the inflation rates measured by consumer price indices in Italy
 (percentage points) (1) 
(1) Differences calculated with respect to twelve-month percentage changes.
Source: P. Del Giovane and R. Sabbatini,"The Introduction of the euro and the divergence between officially measured 
and perceived inflation: the case of Italy",Bank of Italy, 2005
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3. NON-OFFICIAL INDICES
Beyond  the  Istat  (the  official  Italian  statistical  institution),  other  organizations  at  that  time
proposed different inflation indices in order to explain the consumers' perceptions. A lot of them
sustained the version of the consumers, showing higher price increases than official indices did, and
criticized the capability of the Istat's indices to account for the price changes. Such discussion could
have influenced the consumers' opinion about the rise of prices and hurts the consumers' confidence
about  the  official  data,  in  a  moment,  like  the  euro  changeover,  where  such  institutions  were
fundamental in order to reassure the population about the changes, and in the case of the Istat, about
the level of prices. As a consequence of the loss of consumers' trust on Istat, it's possible that a part
of the consumers trusted the non-official institutes, and then to their estimates, starting to believe in
the price increases.
Actually,  we are not stating for sure that the estimates of such non-official studies are wrong.
There is the possibility that the Istat's indices wronged about the price changes in that period and
that  the others  institutions'  estimates were correct.  In this  case could be that  the perception of
consumers was justified and that the price increases were not recognized by the official indices
because of some errors. 
In this chapter we will see some of the fundamental step of the indices construction comparing the
official indices with the indices of the Eurispes, one of the most fiercest opponent of Istat in the
media discussion, in order to verify if the non-official indices could summarize the price changes
better  than  the  official  one,  and  see  if  there  is  some  room for  mistakes  in  both  the  indices
procedures of estimates.
3.1 The basket of goods
As regards  the classification used by Istat,  the different  indices are  gathered in  a hierarchical
structure  of  categories.  It  is  composed  by  five  level,  where  the  first  three  coincide  with  the
international classification Coicop (Classification Of Individual Consumption by Purpose), and the
other  inferior  levels  provide  a  better  insight  of  the  data  but  don't  correspond  to  an  official
international classification. According to classification used we have, for instance, that a certain
price index of yogurt of x brand, is placed in the representative position "yogurt", which is in turn
placed in the sub-class "milk products", in the class "milk, cheeses and eggs", in the group "food"
and in the "food and non-alcoholic beverages" division.
15
Figure 5: Aggregation scheme of indices according to the Coicop classification
Source: translation of Mostacci F. (2004), “Aspetti teorico-pratici per la costruzione di indici dei prezzi al consumo”,
ISTAT document n. 7/2004
To every category,  a  certain weight  is  attributed at  any level,  in order  to  reflect  the different
importance in the typical consumer's basket. These weights are derived from estimates of the final
consumption  of  households  calculated  by the  national  accounts  and the  inquiry  of  households
consumption; and then adapted according to the particular index (NIC, FOI, IPCA). The weights
follow the same hierarchical structure of categories, and every weight is divided among the inferior
categories. For instance,  the weight of 1178 of the "liquor and alcoholic beverages" is divided,
basing on the consumption, on "brandy" (124), "aperitivo" (180), "whisky" (252), "grappa" (250) e
"limoncello" (372) (Mostacci F. 2004).
The  Istat's  basket  was  composed  in  2002,  by  209  sub-classes  of  product,  569  representative
positions, and 930 products, including 52 sub-classes of products and 154 representative positions
in the division "food and non-alcoholic beverages".
Instead, as regards the Eurispes' basket, it includes only the food products, and, as a consequence,
it doesn't summarize the overall price changes. Eurispes itself said that, but it's better emphasize this
given that often in the media discussion this point has often been ignored. So the classification of
the Eurispes' basket is quite smaller of the Istat's basket. Indeed, the Eurispes' basket was composed
by only 50 representative positions gathered in 9 categories, that is also less than the only division
"food and non-alcoholic beverages" of the Istat basket. The dimension of the Eurispes' basket was
one-third of the Istat's food division, and there are no longer different categories of products like
chocolate, olive oil, fresh cheese and others. Then, we can state that the Istat's inflation indices are
more representative also in the Eurispes' own field and that the Eurispes estimates. 
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As regards the weights also the 50  representative positions of the Eurispes'  basket have some
weights to differentiate the different products. However, Eurispes provides no information on how
these weights were determined. And there is the risk that such weights were chosen arbitrarily to
sustain the Eurispes'  opinion,  instead of  being the result  of  a serious  evaluation of  households
consumption like those of Istat.
3.2 The data collection
The basic operation to compute the level of prices is the collection of data, that is the recording of
the  prices  over  time.   For  the  official  indices,  this  phase  is  the  responsibility  of  the  national
statistical institute (Istat) and of the statistical council offices (UCS) scattered in the territory. The
Istat gathers some data in a centralized way from its archive, in particular for those goods that don't
suffer any price's changes over the country (like the tobacco), or that had to be calculated in a
certain way to take account of technological progress. The rest of the prices are gathered by the
UCS, that identifies the various point of sale and locally detects the data selecting the product in
according with the Istat's instructions that define it. The UCS have the power to choose the points of
sale that are, in their opinion, representative of the shopping habits of the consumers in the region,
and  also  the  product  itself  selecting  the  one  that  is,  in  their  opinion,  the  most  sold.  Once  it
happened, the UCS operators take note over time of the different product's prices.
This autonomy of the UCS' operators could be a source of errors as far as the operators make a
mistake, selecting a product that is undersold or selecting a shop that is not very attended by the
consumers of the territory. If that's the case, is understandable the existence of an error due to the
discrepancy between the price changes of the product chosen and the other products, as well as
between the price changes of the shop chosen and those of the other shops. 
But besides the wide-ranging data collection, we need to keep in mind that the collection doesn't
gather all the prices, neither considers all the shops, and then, all the variations that may have been
noticed by the consumers could not be calculated in the official indices, since not detected. The
statement like: "the price of my favorite magazine has increased by the 40% in the newsstand round
the corner" cannot be mirrored by an index that aims to summarize the price changes and to do it
with  low costs.  And  this  fact  also  applies  when  the  operators  don't  make  any mistake  in  the
collecting data,  meaning that there is always a certain error in the estimates. 
Possible errors could be found among the numerous methodological notes of the Istat's inflation
indices about the data collection. A quite important example of it, concerns the methodological note
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about the seasonal products and, in particular, the  fruit and vegetable sectors. In fact, the official
indices provide a special basket to take into account seasonal differences, in terms of availability of
the products and consumer's preferences. Moreover, the calculation process removes the larger price
changes from the indices calculation. As an example of it, the calculation of the "fresh fruit" index
provides an average of different fruits' prices that exclude 25% of the fruits that suffered the highest
increases. The reason is that such calculation is aimed at removing the products that are likely not to
be purchased because of the high price and at smooth the seasonal changes. Obviously, it's possible
that  the  consumers  continue  to  purchase  the  products  excluded  and  it  would  result  in  an
underestimation of the inflation suffered by them.
As regards the Eurispes'  data collection,  not much information is provided, but what we have
suggests that it was a rough data collection because it used, in order to estimate the pre-euro prices,
also the assessment of the consumers and sellers. Despite Eurispes defined these evaluations as
reliable, the fact that they rely on these assessment poses problems about the differences on the
consumers' perceptions and about the reliability of memory as data source. In these circumstances,
it  would  be  better  to  think  about  the  Eurispes  data  as  a  measure  of  the  consumers'  perceived
inflation than a measure of the real inflation,  given that it  is  based partially on the consumers'
evaluation. 
As regards the information about the procedures for selecting the point of sale and the specific
product, as well as the data collection process, they are not provided. But what we can say is that
concerning the coverage of the territory there is an overwhelming difference between the Istat and
Eurispes, since the Eurispes contacted 304 shops of which 182 released a valid interview, with
respect to the thousands of considered Istat's reporting units. 
3.3 The indices construction
Once we have the data, the next step is the index construction. This point, for the Istat, starts with
the elaboration of the inferior indices of the local regions. First, it is built the provincial indices of
every product, simply computing the geometric mean of the indices of the products collected in the
provincial shops. We have then the formula:
where: ni,p is the number of different quotations observed for product I in the province p, u is the
sale point, Iti,u, is the index of the price changes for the i product at time t, P ti,u is the price of the
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I i.p
t =
ni.p√∏u I i.ut =ni.p√∏u P i.utP i.u0 ∀ i ,∀ p
product i in shop u at time t, and P0i,u is the starting price of the product. The provincial indices are
then aggregated in order to build up the regional index with the formula:
where: Iti,r , is the regional index for the product i at time t in the region r, I ti,p is the provincial
index calculated before where p indicates a certain province, and Wi,p is a provincial coefficient that
weights the indices in according to the amount of population in the territory.  We have then the
national indices of every product:
where: Ii is the national index of the i product, Iti,r are the regionals indices, and Wi,p are the weights
used to differentiate the amount of consumption of the product i in the region r in comparison with
the national total consumption. Eventually, we have the overall inflation index through the formula:
where: I is the inflation index, Ii are the various indices of the different products and Wi is the
weight that reflects the relevance of every product among the household's expenses, namely the
amount of consumption of the product over the total consumption.
All  the  weights  present  in  the  formulas  are  derived,  like  the  classification  weights,  from the
estimates of final consumption of households calculated by the national accounts and the inquiry of
households consumption, or they are a mere demographic data.
As regards the Eurispes' procedure of index construction we have no information, but in the case 
that Eurispes had not calculated any of Istat's steps of construction, there is the risk that they have 
given too much importance to low relevance places. For instance, they may have assessed as equals 
an increase of bread prices in the Milan province and in Aosta province (the smallest of Italy), when
19
I i.r
t =
∑
p∈r
I i.p
t ×W i.p
∑
p∈r
W i.p
∀ i ,∀ r
I i=
∑
r=1
20
I i.r×W i.r
0
∑
r=1
20
W i.r
0
∀ i
I=
∑
i=1
n
I i×W i
∑
i=1
n
W i
it's evident that the second increase influences much less the population. Moreover, also the 
different importance of the products among the regions may risk being ignored: this can include, for
example, that in their evaluation the increase of the heating prices would be considered of the same 
importance in Piemonte and in Sicily (whenever Sicilians turn the heating system on).
In conclusion, we have seen that although the official indices are not error-proof and have different
limit, they are actually an information source more reliable of the Eurispes' assessment; which, in 
addition to the problems illustrated, doesn't provide a thorough description of the statistical 
procedures used, and it is the major issue when comes an analysis of this kind. So, there is no 
reason to believe that the Eurispes' estimates or others non-official evaluation can summarize the 
price changes in the period of the euro changeover better than the official indices.
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4. ROUNDING EFFECTS
One of the reasons that usually are ascribed to be the cause of the price increases after the euro 
changeover is the rounding effect of the prices. Namely, the tendency of the shopkeepers to 
rounding up prices every time the price converted from the old currency into euro fall between two 
attractive prices. The rounding-up problem was one of the big worries of the institutions and media 
well before the euro was introduced. The fear was that the shopkeepers that had to translate prices 
from the old currency to the new one, would exploit the changeover and the confusions of 
consumers to rounding up and increase the prices.
Given such worries, a few studies were predisposed to checking this particular aspect. The first
was the ex-ante studies, that settled before the euro changeover, aimed to identify if the issue was
actually a realistic possibility and to assess the potential danger. In particular, the ex-ante studies
aimed to assess the presence of the attractive prices in the markets and, by means of that, assess the
potential inflation that could unleash by the rounding effects. 
4.1 Ex-ante analysis
The study of Mostacci and Sabattini (2001) assessed the potential impact of the rounding effect in
Italy before the euro was released.  In this study, the authors quantify the presence of attractive
prices in the national markets by mean of the checking of 90000 price readings, identifying as
attractive price the one included at least in one of these categories: 
1. Psychological prices: the prices used because the consumers tend to perceive them as lower
prices (for instance 0,99€ instead of 1,00€)
2. Fractional prices: the prices used to simplify the payment and the change (for instance 1,30€
instead of 1,32€)
3. Exact prices: used typically in relative high price to avoid the utilization of coin and low-
denomination banknotes (for instance 50€).
The results of these studies corroborated the hypothesis that the rounding effect could have had a
significant impact on Italy inflation since about 90% of the readings were attractive prices.
In order to estimate the inflationary impact of the rounding effect, it  was assumed that all the
shopkeepers  that  were  using  attractive  prices  would  continue  to  use  them also  after  the  euro
changeover. 
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Then the impact was calculated over 3 different scenarios:
1. The shopkeepers that have a non-attractive price always choose to round up the price to the
next attractive price (worst scenario).
2. The shopkeepers that have a non-attractive price always choose to round down the price to
the first attractive price (best scenario).
3. The shopkeepers that have a non-attractive price choose to round the price to the closer
attractive price (symmetric scenario)
The estimations of the different scenarios were: a 1% prices increase in the worst scenario, slightly
negative inflation (-0.1%) in the symmetric scenario and 1% prices decrease in the best scenario
(these results refer to the whole rounding effect impact of the euro changeover, that could have
taken place in a period longer than only 2002).
Figure 6: Rules for defining attractive prices in euro
Source:  Mostacci. F.  and Sabbatini (2008),  “The Euro, Inflation and Consumers'  Perceptions: Lessons from Italy”,
Berlin: Springer-Verlag: 51-69
4.2 Ex-post analysis
After these studies, further analyses were done after the euro changeover occurred, in order to
verify the real impact of the rounding effect over time and separately consider categories of product
excluded from the ex-ante studies. 
In Italy Mostacci and Sabattini (2003) proceeded with the detection of the data that covered the
price changes of the products in the period between December 2001 and October 2002, recording
the moment when for the first time the prices became attractive prices. In order to establish a range
of  results,  two  different  estimate  methods  were  considered.  The  first  one,  that  assesses  the
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minimum, considers the price changes closely linked to the rounding effect. And the second, that
assesses the maximum, considers all the price changes in the period even if they were potentially
attributable to other factors. 
As regards the first method, once detected that a certain product's price has become attractive at
time t, it is compared with the previous product's price at t-1. According to the direction of the
change,  it  is  considered  the  closer  attractive  price  and is  identified  the  rounding effect  as  the
difference between this attractive price and the starting price at t-1. For example, if we have a price
at t-1 equal to 1,23€ and a price at t equal to 1,30€ (an attractive price), we identify the closer
attractive price of 1,23€ upwards, that is 1,25€ and calculate the rounding effect as the difference
between 1,25 and 1,23. So, in this case, the increase due to the rounding effect would result to be
0,02€, while the difference of 0,05€ between 1,25€ and 1,30€ would be ascribed to other factors.
About the second estimating method, it starts with dividing all the prices in according to the table
in figure 7.
Figure 7: Divisions of the prices for the analysis
Source:  Mostacci. F.  and Sabbatini (2008),  “The Euro, Inflation and Consumers'  Perceptions: Lessons from Italy”,
Berlin: Springer-Verlag: 51-69
The table classifies prices according to the status at time t and at time t-1. The purpose of this
classification is to isolate those prices that became attractive price for the first time (S2) from all the
others (S1), namely the prices that did not become attractive yet (S1B) which changes is not due to
the rounding effects of the euro, and the prices that just became attractive in the past (S1A and
S1C), that have just exhaust their euro-related rounding effect.
After the classification, the inflationary impact was computed as the results of this formula:
IM2= (VC2-VC1)*W2
where IM2 is the inflationary impact of the euro changeover, VC2 is percentage change of the
prices between t and t-1 for S2 , VC1 is percentage change of the prices between t and t-1 for S1,
and W2 is the weight of S2 with respect to all the products.
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The advantage of this formulation consists of considering all the change occurred from time t-1 to
time t, moreover, removing from VC2 the changes showed among the prices that have no rounding
inflationary impact (VC1), it clears out the calculation from the markets trends.
However, this method includes in the calculation also other factors not related to the rounding
effect  and for  this  reason,  it  was  considered as  an  upper  limit  of  the range.  For  instance,  if  a
restaurant chose to increase the price of a dish concurrently with the change of the menu from the
old currency to the new one, it will results that all the change is caused by the rounding effect of the
euro, even if the restaurant would have increased the prices in any case.
The final results of the ex-post studies showed how the number of attractive prices was, like the
ex-ante studies,  the 90% of the prices in Italy in 2001. And that,  after  the euro changeover in
January 2002, the number of attractive prices lowered to 20%, and then gradually recover until the
50% in October 2002.
The rounding effects  of  the  first  and second method are  summarized  in  the  figures  8  and 9.
Overall, we can note that the total impact of the rounding effects is assessed between 0,2% and
0,8% of inflation. And that these price increases were more present in the services market segment
than the grocery and non-grocery one, and more in the products sold by the traditional channel with
respect to the modern. 
A clarification needs to be done about the categories of product that were excluded from this
analysis and also from the ex-ante one, as the fresh food, the rents, energetic commodities and
financial services. For some of them, it's understandable the decision to exclude from the analysis;
the energetic commodities like the gas, generally, don't suffer from rounding effects, maintaining
the price determined by the market. Similarly, the rounding effect in the rents, the durable goods
and in the insurance services, is marginal given the high unit cost. But as regards the public tariff
and the fresh food the exclusion was due to other reasons.  The public tariffs were assumed to be
stable since the public institutions assured that they would not change them, or that if they would,
the changes would be in favor of the consumers. And the fresh food was excluded for difficulty on
the detection of the prices.
Seeing among these two categories in the period after the euro changeover, we see that, as regards
the public tariff, the promise of the public institutions was honored, indeed we have in such period a
historical minimum, and the only prices that actually increased were the prices of some lottery and
gambling. More complex is the issue about the fresh food, that,  as we have just seen, suffered
increases of prices in all the European countries, and about 8-9% of increase for Italy in the period
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between  January  2001  and  January  2002.  Considering  these  data  in  the  ex-post  analysis,  the
inflationary rounding effect impact range becomes between the 0,35% and 1,15% in total.
Although the analysis of Mostacci and Sabbatini is quite good, and the estimates of the rounding
effect  being  relative  light,  remain  some consideration  to  do  before  we  can  acknowledge  such
results.
The first one regards the analysis that gives the minimum of the range impact. In such analysis is
not considered that the prices could have significant changes. For example, if we imagine to have
two products with the same non-attractive price 7,24€, and we suppose that one of these is rounding
up at 7,29€ that is the closer attractive price, while the other is rounding to 7,00€ when the closer
attractive price is 7,19€; we have that the rounding effect estimated by the first  method is (7,29-
7,24)-(7,19-7,24)=  0  while  the  true  inflation  change  is  (7,29-7,24)-(7,00-7,24)=  -0,19.  In  other
words, we can say that this method tends to assess more the numbers of changes going up and down
than the true inflationary rounding effect. 
As regards the maximum estimate of the range, it doesn't provide so much information. Indeed, the
only difference between this estimate and a pure inflation index is that the changes at time t of the
prices just became attractive (VC2) are lessened by the changes of the other set (VC1). It means that
every time a price becomes attractive with an abnormal change with respect to the other set, such
change would be recognized as due to the rounding effect. Such method creates problems when we
have a country with a general positive inflation, like was Italy in the first years of 21st century.
Because  every  time  a  firm updates  upwards  its  prices  list,  it  temporarily  steps  outside  of  the
market's values in order to catch a part of the future price increases. This leads to the presence of an
impact ascribed to the rounding effect but actually due to the natural market dynamics.
To sum up, if we have a general positive inflation, it's almost impossible that the upper limit output
of the authors would be 0, and then it probably overestimates the maximum rounding effect. While
the lower limit is biased by the number of prices increasing and decreasing and not related to the
actual values changes. In the end, given the results of the studies, we can't say that the rounding
effect was enough significant to be accused to be the reasons of the consumers' complaints about the
prices.
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Figure 8: Inflationary effect of rounding in the broad sense (Method 1) 
by the type of product and distribution channel
Source:  P.  Del  Giovane  and  R.  Sabbatini,"The  Euro,  Inflation  and  Consumers'  Perceptions:  Lessons  from Italy",
Springer Science & Business Media, 2008 
Figure 9: Inflationary effect of rounding in the strict sense (Method 2) 
by the type of product and distribution channel
Source:  P.  Del  Giovane  and  R.  Sabbatini,"The  Euro,  Inflation  and  Consumers'  Perceptions:  Lessons  from Italy",
Springer Science & Business Media, 2008 
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5. EXPLANATIONS OF THE INFLATION PERCEPTION BIAS
Not  always  the  population  is  aware  of  the  current  moves  of  inflation  and  sometimes  their
perspective is not even close to the actual data. This was probably the case of the perceptions after
the euro changeover since the inflation data don't show any peculiar change with respect to other
periods. At this point, all that's left to do is to explore the dynamics beyond the inflation indices and
analyze the consumers' perception and how they could be born.
Firstly, it has to be said that the discrepancy is probably the result of the fact that the human's brain
is not built to assess the phenomenon in a systematic and rational way like do the official indices.
So much so that a first problem regards the limited knowledge of the consumers about economic
phenomena and in particularly inflation. Indeed, Behrend (1977) highlights, among the consumers,
a lack of understanding of the inflation meaning, and in particular the difference between the level
of prices and the purchasing power. 
However, other studies showed how the individuals, even though they may have an imperfect
understanding of the economic notions, are able to give a rudimentary interpretation of them and
their interconnections (Williamson and Wearing 1996).  Jonnung (1981) have experimented a study
on the inflation in Sweden, finding that, despite the presence of some errors, a lot of consumers
were able to give a pretty accurate estimate of inflation, while a minority showed a poor or absent
knowledge of  the  matter.  Some studies  have  noticed  how there  is  some structural  tendency to
overestimate the inflation rate. For instance, Bates and Gabor (1986), in their study regarding the
UK  consumers’  knowledge  of  prices  and  price  changes  in  specific  product,  showed  how  the
consumers perceived increase of prices was up to four times higher of the actual increases.
Even  if  these  studies  report  different  results,  what  we  can  conclude  is  that:  there  are  some
circumstances that could lead the consumers to overestimate inflation. 
In order to have some ideas of the phenomenon and of the variables that can affect the perceived
inflation, we can see the scheme in the figure 10 elaborated by Ranyard, R., Del Missier, F., Bonini,
N., Duxberry, D., Summers, B. (2008). Where we can see that the perceptions are affected by the
real inflation rate, the expectations of the future inflations, the social amplification of belief and also
the attitudes that can affect the assessment by mean of previous experiences. Even if the scheme is
quite clear we need to keep in mind that the factors are not limited to reported one. Indeed, there is a
lot of others factor that can affect the perceived inflation. In particular, the individual characteristics
determine, to a certain extent, the level of understanding about inflation and then the precision of
the  consumer  estimation.  For  instance,  we  can  agree  that  the  level  of  education  can  have  a
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significant impact on the consumer's precisions of estimate (especially when the education concerns
economic studies), or that the age can affect the knowledge of some product ( it's not unrealistic to
think that the young people have not knowledge about the prices of the old people health-care).
Figure 10: A conceptual framework for understanding perceived and expected inflation.
Source: Ranyard, R., Del Missier, F., Bonini, N., Duxberry, D., Summers, B. (2008). "Perceptions and expectations of
price changes and inflation: A review and conceptual framework". Journal of Economic Psychology, 29, 378–400. 
Another  factor,  that  could  be  partially  included  in  attitudes,  is  that  the  people  build  their
assessment on fragmented information from the past, that suffer further elaborations at the moment
the consumer bring them back to mind.  Related to the memory topic, there are a lot of possible
sources of error, for instance, the study of Kemp (1999), illustrates how the individual fill the lack
of information by mean of association. Referring to our case, a consumer well informed about the
price of the oranges could start thinking that the price of the fruits increase whenever the price of
oranges increase, even if actually the price of the other kind of fruit have different patterns. 
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Summarizing, we can say that the perceived inflation is the results of a lot of different factors that
could lead far from the actual inflation rate in some circumstances.
Given the importance of the perceived inflation among the consumers, and given the worry that
the euro changeover aroused about the stability of prices, a lot of European countries commissioned
studies to observe the changes on the perceived inflation during the euro introduction. As regards
Italy,  the  observation  of  the  perceived  inflation  was  carried  out  by the  Isae  (an  Italian  public
institution of economic analysis), and once finished, published by the European Commission with
the surveys of the other countries. The Isae study actually regards different aspects of the economy
and is performed by the interview of about 2000 people in all the country.
What let us develop an understanding of the perceived inflation by the consumers is the question:
"How do you think prices  in  Italy have developed in the last  12 months?" with the following
available answers: “risen a lot” (N1), “risen moderately” (N2), “risen slightly” (N3), “stayed about
the same” (N4),  “fallen” (N5),  and “don’t  know”. Given the structure of the answers,  the Isae
derives  an  index  of  the  perceived  inflation  by  computing  a  weighted  average  of  the  different
answers. The formula used by the Isae is  S= N1+0,5N2-0,5N4-N5, where S is the index of the
perceived inflation, and the different N are the answers of the question. It was used as reference
value "risen slightly" because it was considered the “real answer”, and measured the other different
answers as results of the distance from this one (except "don’t know" that was excluded).
Even if this perception index data can't be directly compared with the actual inflation ones, since
they refer to different scales, they are proposed in the graph (figure 11) together, in order to note
possible similarity in the trends of the two series and, most of all, if there is a discrepancy at the
time of the changeover between the perceptions and the official data. 
We can note that since the early years reported in the graph there is some correlation between the
two series, that last until 2002 where there was an abnormal discrepancy between the two indices
with the perceived inflation index that suffered a great increase and greatly overcome the actual
inflation rate. Looking at the data we see in this moment that the percentage of consumers that
believe the prices have “risen a lot” grew up, between the end of 2001 and the beginning of 2003,
from 10% to 49%, and that the percentage of consumers that answered “risen moderately” risen
from 48% to 89%. Only from 2004, there was a gradual comeback of the perceived inflation to the
actual inflation rate.
Comparing the data of Italy with those of the euro-zone we note that also in other countries, there
is a general increase perceived inflation with respect to real inflation, but we can note also that such
discrepancy started in the 2000, well before the euro changeover.
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Figure 11: Inflation measured by the statistical institute and inflation perceptions
(twelve-month percentage change in harmonized consumer price index, percentage balances of responses)
(1)Qualitative indicator obtained as the percentage balance of responses to the monthly consumer survey (right-hand 
scale)
(2)Twelve-month rate of increase in the harmonized index of consumer prices (left-hand scale).
Source: P. Del Giovane and R. Sabbatini,"The Introduction of the euro and the divergence between officially measured
and perceived inflation: the case of Italy",Bank of Italy, 2005
The Italian data actually showed a perfect coincidence with new currency introduction, but it is
caused by the sudden fall of the perceived inflation in the second half of 2001. If we exclude such
period we can see how the Italian's trend is quite similar to the rest of the euro-zone. This would
suggest that the discrepancy of the two series was born at the eve of the new millennium from
factors probably not related to the euro changeover.
It's not excluded, however, that the discrepancy in 2000 could be the results of some anticipation
effects  related  to  the  euro that  could have  affected the  inflation expectations.  For  instance,  it's
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possible that consumers expected some homogenization of the prices due to the liberalization of the
markets and the customs tariff disposal, and that have shifted these beliefs in the present behavior.
Anyway, it's  unlikely that such  anticipation effects could have affected the data with so much
advance, in the end, we are talking about consumers and not financial operators. Rather it's more
realistic  that  the  discrepancy was  caused  by some other  independent  event  like  2000  crisis,  a
decrease of the trust about the economic system, a change of the consumer information sources or
simply by the increase of inflation in 1999. Anyway, even if the euro introduction wasn't the starting
point of the increase perceived inflation, it is likely that it has strengthened this phenomenon, given
that the perceptions have worsened after 2002. 
5.1 Individual characteristics and subjectivity
Also,  the  individual  characteristics  can  affect  the  perceived  inflation  of  the  consumers.  One
variable that can be more significant than others could be the personal income, since to different
income usually we have different consumption habits. For instance, foods have a heavier presence
on the low-income consumers, and the luxury goods have more space for high-income ones. In such
situation,  if  the  price  of  the food or  the  goods typically bought  by the low-income consumers
increase, then these consumers would suffer the price increase more than high-income ones.
Obviously,  besides  the  income,  there  are  other  characteristics  that  can  affect  the  perceptions,
including  the  type  of  employment  and  level  of  education.  About  these  variables,  the  Isae
reconstructed the data of the surveys dividing the data in reason of the different variables. The data
of perceived inflation obtained in this way (figure 12) show that there was a difference between the
high and low-income consumers and that the latter perceived far more inflation than the others.
As regards the education degree the dynamics were quite similar to the income. The consumers
with lower degree perceived more inflation of the consumers with a high degree. And about the job
status, the higher perception came from the households and from the pensioners, while the workers
perceived less inflation than the others.
These data confirm that the inflation perceptions depend on the individual characteristics in some
extent, and it takes on greater significance whenever the segments of consumers like the pensioners,
with low-income or low-degree, make up a great part of the whole population. Moreover, it doesn't
finish with the mathematical increase of the perception, because these segments could have affected
the rest of population by means of the media and word of mouth.
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Even if  these  data  showed how some segments  of  the population could  have perceived more
inflation  than  others,  the  data  don't  explain  so  much about  the  perceived inflation  of  the  euro
changeover. Indeed, such differences are more or less constant in time and not specific related to the
euro introduction. And moreover all the consumers also those with high income and high degree
complained about an increase in prices. Thus, it is not among these differences that lie the answer to
our problem.
Figure 12: Inflation perceptions in Italy by income bracket, educational attainment and work status
of the respondents 
Source:  Isae  data  by P.  Del  Giovane and  R.  Sabbatini,"The Introduction  of  the  euro  and the  divergence  between
officially measured and perceived inflation: the case of Italy",Bank of Italy, 2005
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5.2 Purchasing power
A possible explanation to the conventional wisdom that prices have risen could be that consumers
have not experienced the prices risen, but rather a reduction of the individual income, and then, of
the purchasing power. In order to verify if this could be the cause, we can see the data referring to
the economic situation of the households in figure 13.
Figure 13: Household income and equivalised income: average value at constant prices
(index numbers, 1991=100)
Source: Banca d’Italia (2012). "I bilanci delle famiglie italiane nell’anno 2010", Supplemento al Bollettino Statistico -
Indagini campionarie. Anno XXII, numero 6. Banca d’Italia: Roma. 
In the graph,  we can see either  the households'  income or  the equivalised income (that  is  an
elaboration of the households' income that takes into account the different size and composition of
the family). In both cases, it's notable a substantial stagnation of data in the period between 2001
and 2002, that exclude the decrease of purchasing power from the possible causes of the abnormal
inflation perceptions. 
However, there still is the possibility that a concentration of wealth happened so that a great part of
the population became poorer. In order to verify it, we can rely on the Gini's index that gives us a
clear picture of the evolution of inequality among the population of a certain country.
As regards Italy we have in figure 14 the Gini's index, that shows how in the period of interest
around  2002,  the  index  had  a  significant  reduction  compared  with  previous  years,  that  means
inequality have contracted and the people's wealth has become more equal.
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Indeed, the wealth of the richest decile decreased in such period for the benefit of the rest of the
population  that  have  increased  their  wealth.  As regards  the  50% of  the  poorest  population  the
situation has not changed, whilst there was a slight increase in population with a negative wealth.
What we can deduce from these results is that in around 2002 the wealth moved from the 10%
richest people to the upper-middle class, whilst the rest of the population has not seen any peculiar
move of their wealth, neither in worse or better. And eventually, there is no way that the abnormal
perceived inflation of 2002 could be caused by a decrease in purchasing power.
Figure 14: Distribution of households net wealth in the period 1991-2010
(percentage)
Source: Banca d’Italia (2012). "I bilanci delle famiglie italiane nell’anno 2010", Supplemento al Bollettino Statistico -
Indagini campionarie. Anno XXII, numero 6. Banca d’Italia: Roma. 
5.3 Frequency bias
Among the theories proposed to explain the abnormal perceived inflation, one of the more treated
is the frequency bias, according to which the consumers have the tendency to give an excessive
weight to the products purchased more frequently when comes to assess the inflation rate. In other
words, the consumers lack the ability to determine the weight of every product rationally like do the
official indices, weighting the products with their actual weight in the family budget. For instance,
it's not absurd to think that the average consumer pays more attention to the prices of foods, rather
than the travel expenses or car, which could be underestimated because considered rare or as unique
costs.
The theory of the frequency bias become more relevant if we consider the fact that, in January
2002, the euro changeover had washed away the reference prices of the different products from the
consumers' mind, triggering a new learning process about the new prices. Indeed, this process may
34
not have been homogeneous because the consumers learn faster the price of the products purchased
more frequently, since more visible; and learn much slower the prices about the rarer purchased
ones. The result of it would be that the perception of inflation in the first period after the euro
changeover was based almost entirely on the frequent purchased product changes.
On this matter,  some studies were just present in the literature but was the abnormal inflation
perceptions of the euro changeover that promoted more studies about the frequency bias.  Indeed,
after 2002, different studies tried to verify this kind of error among the consumers. One of them was
done by Georgans, Healy and Li (2014), that set up an experiment in order to test if actually the
consumers rely more on the frequent purchased products' prices to estimate the overall inflation.
And the results of this  study, like the others,  showed how there is this kind of bias among the
consumers.
In order to determine if this theory can be plausible in our case, it must be that the price of frequent
products, in the period considered, increased more than the others products did. Indeed, if it would
not be the case, there is no reason to think it could be the cause of the abnormal inflation perception.
We can analyze the price changes of the different frequency products thanks to the Istat's inflation
data elaborated by Del Giovane and Sabattini.
Figure 15: Inflation rates for goods and services in Italy according to frequency of purchase
 (quarterly data; twelve-month percentage changes of the sub-indices) 
Source: P. Del Giovane and R. Sabbatini,"The Introduction of the euro and the divergence between officially measured
and perceived inflation: the case of Italy",Bank of Italy, 2005
In the graph (Figure 15), is summarized the changes of two different sets of prices, the first named
"high frequency" contains the prices of the product purchased at least one time a month like the
food goods, the cigarettes and fuel, and the second called "low frequency" that regards all the others
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products. We can note that starting from 2000 there is a discrepancy between the two series that for
two years until then were well correlated. It seems, then, that it's plausible that the rise in perceived
inflation could have been caused by an increase of the high frequency purchased product. 
These  values,  however,  are  not  enough  in  order  to  clarify  the  great  difference  between  the
perceived inflation and the actual inflation rate, since the difference between the two series is only
about 1-2%. It would explain it if the perceived inflation of the consumer was lower, but it's hard to
believe that they could explain the survey's data. Moreover, we need to say that the discrepancy
between the two series started in 2001, i.e. far ahead from the increased perceived inflation of 2002.
And it would suggest that there is no relation between the two phenomena. 
On the other hand, the consumers could have paid attention to the frequency product's prices only
once the euro was introduced, ignoring them for all the period until then. If this was the case, there
is  the  risk  that  if  the  consumers  had ignored  the  inflation  of  the  frequency product,  they had
ascribed all the increases of 2001 to 2002 and then to the euro changeover. However, if we take a
look to the rest of the euro-zone, we will see that not always to the rise of the high frequency
purchased prices corresponds an increase of the price perceptions (Insee 2003), implying that there
are other causes that could affect the perception (or that switch on the frequency bias).
About the analysis of Del Giovane and Sabattini, the choices of the two sets might have hidden
other phenomena, indeed it's possible that the sets that affect the consumers perception are smaller
and may be linked with some routine situations, like eating at the restaurant or buying the usual
newspaper; and that other products have much less impact on the perceptions. In such case, it's
possible that the products with more impact suffered more inflation than 2%, and they may be the
cause of the inflation perceptions. Another point is that maybe if we consider a different frequency
to  distinguish  the  "high  frequency"  product  to  the  "low  frequency"  the  data  may  be  more
pronounced, since it's hard to believe that all the products have as breakthrough point one month,
where if the product is purchased more often than monthly is important otherwise not. Probably it
would be wiser to consider both the frequency and price itself, since both of them can affect the
visibility of the purchase, and build up different sets based on visibility.
In conclusion, even if it's not possible to verify a clear impact of the frequency bias, the data
gathered  confirm an  increase  of  the  frequent  purchased  products  in  Italy  and  then  we  cannot
exclude that this may have affected the consumers' perception, either be only the cause of it or at
least one the factors at stake.
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5.4 Loss aversion
Another factor that could have affected the consumers' opinion is the so-called loss-aversion, that
is the tendency of consumers to perceive the losses somewhat stronger than the gains of equal
extent.
The phenomenon of loss aversion came out thanks to Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (1979)
and their prospect theory,  that tries to explain the behaviors  of consumers by mean of different
factors detected by experiments over the years. And some of these experiments highlighted that
individuals ascribe different importance to gain and losses of the same extent, where the losses are
perceived as twice relevant.
In our case, if we assume that the price increases are perceived as a loss by the consumers (and the
decreases as a gain), it leads to a concrete possibility that the consumers are biased from such loss
aversion.
Figure 16: Prospect Theory and Inflation Perceptions 
Source: L. Dräger, J. Menz, U. Fritsche, " Perceived Inflation under Loss Aversion", No 201105, Macroeconomics and
Finance Series from Hamburg University, Department Wirtschaft und Politik, 2011
If we consider, for instance, to have a basket of two goods (A and B) of equal prices, and let A
increase by 0,50€, and B decreases by 0,50€; if we calculate the inflation rate of the basket, we will
get a 0 percentage change. However, if we are under the loss aversion the consumers wouldn't do a
simple average of the prices but would assign a heavier weight to the loss, since consumers are
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more concerned about the increase of A's price than satisfied of the B's price decrease. According to
this second case, and assuming the losses importance to be twice the gains one, we will have that
the perceived inflation are equals to 2/3*0,50+1/3*(-0,50)=0,17€, which means that the consumers
could perceive a positive inflation when actually there is a stability of prices.
As regards the real data, a suggestion of a possible impact of the loss aversion in the inflation
perception of 2002, came out by the study of Lena Dräger, Jan-Oliver Menz and Ulrich Fritsche
(2011), who analyzed the data of ten countries of the euro-zone. In their study they tried to explain
the euro inflation perceptions by making a regression between the actual inflation and the perceived
inflation, first looking for some linear relationship, and then if a non-linear bound was present.
The results of the analysis suggested that a non-linear relationship was present between the real
data  and  the  perceptions,  where  the  non-linear  relation  takes  a  similar  shape  of  the  relevance
function between the losses-gains in the prospect theory (figure 16). In particular, they got that the
worsening of the consumers' perception became more pronounced after the overcoming of a certain
inflation rate value (or reference point in the prospect theory), detected to be around the 1,8% and
3,3%. In other words, assuming that this behavior is due to the loss aversion effect, the consumers,
expecting an inflation rate of 1,8-3,3%, perceive far more inflation for every increase of the real
inflation rate whenever these values are overcome. And that, they perceive less inflation when the
real data are under this point.
Given the similarity of the perceive patterns of this study with the prospect theory's loss aversion,
it's  quite likely that we're  talking of the same phenomenon, even if  we can't  prove it.  Another
coincidence is that the study showed that at time of the euro changeover there was a reinforcement
of the non-linear relationship. This is interesting because it shows how the environment or other
factors could affect the "loss aversion" phenomenon enhancing it in same circumstances, and that
may  mean  that  there  are  hidden  other  factors  which  may  be  the  true  cause  of  the  abnormal
perceptions.
Even if there are some clues that the loss aversion could be one of the factors liable of 2002's
perceptions, we have to say that the overall inflation in 2002 was not so much higher than the
reference point of the study, actually, it might be less than it. However, if we apply the logic not to
the overall inflation but to every product's price change then it could work, but there is no evidence
of such approach by the consumers.
In conclusion, these results showed how there could be a relation between the abnormal inflation
perception and the loss aversion, but like the other psychological factors we can't state for sure that
it is the cause of the inflation perception of 2002, even if it is likely that it played a role.
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5.5 Focus on extreme variations
A similar bias of the loss aversion is the tendency to pay more attention to the larger variations of
the prices and ignore the small changes. For example, if we imagine that there is a large increase of
a certain product, that is compensated by other small changes of many other products in a way that
the overall inflation is equal to zero, the consumer could assign too much relevance to the increase,
since more visible than the other changes.
We can see if in 2002 there was a particular increase of the relevant increases prices looking at the
price changes distribution. Figure 17 shows the price changes distribution dividing the changes into
a few classes based on the extent of the annual percentage change of prices, in the period 1999-
2002. It's obtained then the frequencies of the various changes classes (without any interference by
the relevance of the product in the basket).
Figure 17: Distribution in percentage classes of the annual average price changes 
Source: Istat (2003), "Rapporto annuale. La situazione del Paese 2002", Roma 
We can note that, as regards 1999 and 2000, the changes of prices are included mostly in the range
of 0-3%, while in the year 2001 and 2002 they are located in a greater extent in the upper-classes of
changes. This difference would sustain the possibility that it is the cause of the abnormal inflation
perceptions since the increases have become higher in absolute value respect the previous years.
However, like the frequency bias, also 2001 shows a similar changes distribution and we'd expect to
be  in  this  year  that  the  perceived  prices  arose,  instead  of  2002.  Obviously  here,  like  for  the
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frequency bias,  it  is possible that the euro introduction had triggered new forces,  absent in the
previous  years,  and  that  the  distortion  effect  in  the  perceptions  started  only  once  euro  was
introduced.  Another consideration is that the distribution of the changes regards the Istat data of
inflation and then it inherits also the limitation of them. Indeed, it could be that the consumers
looked at the prices that were not detected by the Istat indices, and then noticed prices absent and
not considered by the graph. 
In conclusion, the data show the possibility that a particular high attention for the high changes
could be one of the causes of the consumers' 2002 perceptions, even if we can not prove if it was
the cause or not.
5.6 Media influence
It's not so strange that the social interaction plays an important role in building the consumers'
perceptions since it is the main source of information for a great part of the population. Indeed, with
the  word  social  interaction  we  mean  all  external  factors  to  the  consumer  that  through
communication can affect the consumer's perceptions, like the television, the word of mouth and the
media in general.
This large set of means could influence the consumers' perception in different ways. First of all,
the number of information conveyed by the media could be by itself a significant factor, since it
focuses the attention of the audience on certain topics so that other topics go unnoticed. Secondly,
being the  media  the  main  source  of  information  for  the  consumers  they are  able  to  affect  the
perceptions, not only choosing which topics talk about, but also by mean of the way they do it, and
by the interpretations they give of each information. The media should give a complete overview of
the  news,  but  often  we  see  how  the  media  operators  give  a  personal  interpretation  of  them
depending on which political opinion they have (or their opinion in general), and that's why we
usually have contrasting messages by the media. And this translates into a diversification of the
opinions  among  the  audience  of  the  different  media,  which  further  exacerbate  the  opinions
distances.
Regards the abnormal perceived inflation of 2002, it's possible that the media influence would lead
to an amplification of the negative opinion because of the preference to spread and communicate
the bad news, in order to get more audience. This possibility was explored by the study of Soroka
(2006) that analyzed the time series of some UK economic indicators, observing the relative media
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coverage of these issues and the public opinion (1986-2000). And he has found that the media tends
to focus more on disclose the bad news rather than the good changes.
Seeing the situation in Italy, we see that the media relevance of inflation, in the years following the
euro  introduction,  was  exceptionally  high.  And,  also  seeing  the  period  previous  the  euro
changeover, there is a high attention, caused by the high inflation rate recognized in 1999-2000
years and by the imminent new currency introduction and the potential risk of inflation due to it.
Once the euro was introduced, the media had assiduously followed the topic checking the price
changes, and even calling into question the capability of the official indices to represent the actual
price changes, comparing them with non-official indices, like the Eurispes, which sustained to be
able to explain the consumers perceptions showing higher prices inflation with their indices.
We can see the media coverage of the euro inflation thanks to Del Giovane and Sabbatini, that
gathered the articles that talked about the euro inflation of two Italian major newspapers: La Stampa
and Il sole 24 ore. The authors selected the articles of these two newspapers with two searches
criteria in order to detect those are talking about our topic:
1. Articles in whose title was present at least one of these keywords: “caro-vita”,“caro-prezzi”,
“costo della vita” (all three of them mean cost of living);
2. Articles  with  “inflazione”  (inflation)  or  “caro-vita”(cost  of  living)  in  the  title,  and
“associazioni” (associations) or “consumatori” (consumers) in the text.
After the selection, it was compiled the time series of the frequency of such articles over time. We
can see in the first graph (figure 18) that the first search criteria shows no evidence of an increase in
the articles in the period 2002-2003 as regards Il sole 24 ore, indeed we see similar attention to the
topic in the previous years. The significant increase of attention there was in 2000, probably due to
the high inflation rate  of that  year  and to the warnings about  the coming of the new currency
potential inflation effect. Otherwise, as regards the second key research, it detected a slight increase
in the number of articles after 2002, and again the attention increase in 2000.
Similar results, but more pronounced, came from the data of La Stampa (figure 19), that shows a
significant increase starting in 2002 but show no peculiar change about 2000, probably due to the
lower specialization of La Stampa in the economic fields compared to Il Sole 24 ore.
Such data show how there is a relation between the perceived inflation and the attention of the
media. However, the connection may be less informative than it appears to be, given that there is
the possibility that the articles were only capturing the feelings of the population and not some
driving effect of the news. Probably the interest of the media to the phenomenon and the increasing
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interest  of the population on following that topic reinforces each other,  rising the extent of the
consumers' worries.
However, about the analysis, it refers to the topic attention by the media, but there is no evidence
that they accused the euro to be the cause of inflation, and actually neither that the prices arose.
Then the data  catch only the quantitative dimension of the media coverage.  If  we imagine the
scenario where the media are well divided between those who claim that prices were increased due
to the euro introduction and those sustain there was not an abnormal increase of prices, it is likely
that a certain part of the population would believe to the first. In the worst scenario where the media
is  more  inclined  to  disclose  the  bad version of  the  news there would  be  a  greater  part  of  the
population that believe them, and then that believe the prices are increased.
In conclusion, even if we can't state that the media were responsible of the abnormal perceived
inflation in 2002, we can state that there was a particular attention to the phenomenon and that
probably it could be a cause of the abnormal perception in some extent. Moreover, it's possible that
the media spread a certain dose of concerns and skepticism about the euro in the years before the
changeover,  that  could  have  affected  the  perception  and  the  consumers'  approach  to  the  new
currency.
Figure 18: Inflation perceptions and number of related articles in Il Sole 24 Ore 
Source: P. Del Giovane and R. Sabbatini,"The Introduction of the euro and the divergence between officially measured
and perceived inflation: the case of Italy",Bank of Italy, 2005
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Figure 19: Inflation perceptions and number of related articles in La Stampa 
Source: P. Del Giovane and R. Sabbatini,"The Introduction of the euro and the divergence between officially measured
and perceived inflation: the case of Italy",Bank of Italy, 2005
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6. AN EXPLANATION BASED ON CONFIRMATION BIAS
Until now we have seen how the consumers' perceptions are not reflected by the real data and that,
maybe, it is due to the perception biases. We have discussed how the perceptions can depend on the 
individual characteristics, the theory of a major influence of the frequently purchased products, of a 
possible selective attention to certain variations and, eventually, the media influence.
In addition to such explanations, here we propose a new possible interpretation of the 
phenomenon, based on the tendency of the consumers to confirm their own expectations. This 
tendency is known in the literature as confirmation bias, and we can define it as the tendency of 
people to consider only the proof that sustains their hypothesis and ignore the ones which could 
debunk them. An example of the confirmation bias could be seen when an individual who sustains a
certain politic party tends to read the newspapers of similar political thinking in order to receive 
satisfaction to be right. Indeed, these newspapers usually bring out every positive aspect of the party
actions and put in a bad light the other factions, preventing the reader to have a clear vision of the 
facts and to change their political thinking. Another, more intuitive, example is when a scholar 
working on a thesis gathers only the literature that sustains his arguments avoiding to report the 
articles that could give rise to doubts about his conclusions.
One of the first authors that faced this kind of cognitive biases was Wason with his famous 
experiment (Wason P. C.1960), that is still today one of the most reported in the literature. Imagine 
you are being asked to detect a logic rule about the series of numbers 2 – 4 – 6, by mean of others 
series proposing that could be: accepted if it follows the rule, or refused if it doesn't. You may note 
that all three numbers are even, so you might propose a series like 2 – 6 – 10 that will be accepted, 
or you could try “the multiple of two” hypothesis with the 8 – 10 – 12 series, that will also be 
accepted. Actually, neither of them is the true rule, and a lot of subjects wronged to supply the exact
response. Indeed the major part of them, after a certain amount of propose acceptations, were sure 
of their answers and stated that the logic rule was an increasing series of even numbers or an 
increasing series of multiple of 2. In reality, they wronged since the right rule was a merely series of
increasing numbers, regardless of whether they were even or multiple of 2. Eventually, the 
experiment showed how the subjects tried to, almost solely, verify their hypothesis, while only a 
small part of them tried to test their hypothesis proposing series that could debunk it. Indeed, if they
would want to verify their ideas they should have proposed a series like 7 – 9 – 11 in order to find 
out that neither the multiple of 2 nor the even number hypothesis were the right answer.
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Later, authors like Joshua Klayman and Young-Won Ha sustained that the Wason experiment didn't
show a confirmation bias as formulated by Wason, but rather a preference for the positive tests, that 
is "testing a hypothesis by examining instances in which the property or event is expected to occur, 
to see if it does occur" (Klayman, J., and Y. Ha, 1987, “Confirmation, disconfirmation and 
information in hypothesis testing”, Psychological Review 94, 212)
The difference between the two interpretations is that, according to Wason, people, regardless of 
the kind of question, tends to look for the confirmation of their ideas and ignore the proof that 
debunks them; instead, according to Klayman and Ha, people tend to do positive test in order to 
verify the hypothesis and such strategy brings, only in certain circumstances, to an error. Indeed, the
mistake that the subjects make depend on the nature of the relationship between the subjects' 
hypothesis and the true rule. There are cases where the positive test brings to an error and other 
cases in which it results to be an effective verification method. In order to see each of these cases 
we report an example by Klayman and Ha, that can illustrate every possible situation, and then we 
will see what happen in the different cases. 
Imagine being an astrophysicist that wants to identify the rule over the presence of planets around 
the stars. We have a domain composed of all the stars in the universe, part of them have some 
planets (set T) and some not, and there is a rule that could exactly identify every one of them. Our 
purpose is to find out what this rule is by testing our hypothesized rule (stars supposed to have 
planets: set H) and see if it can be assumed to be the true rule. Within the example we can imagine 
testing our hypothesis by pointing a telescope at the stars: if we point a star that, under our 
hypothesized rule, should have planets we are doing a positive test; otherwise, if we are pointing to 
a star that shouldn't have any planets, it's a negative test. 
Supposing that our hypothesized rule is H:"the yellow stars have planets", we will see what 
happen with different true rules. In the first case (figure 20), we can imagine a situation in which 
our hypothesis is more strict than the true one, for example with T: "the red and yellow stars have 
planets".
In this case, we can note that with a positive test there is no possibility to obtain a falsification of 
our hypothesis even if it is wrong. Indeed pointing a yellow star, we would have every time a 
confirmation of our hypothesis, but we'd never be able to know that also the red stars have planets. 
If we'd do a negative test, seeing if a non-yellow star has no planets we have two cases: we are 
seeing a no-red star that has no planets or we are seeing a red star that has planet. In the first case 
we have an ambiguous verification like the positive test, but in the second case we would know for 
sure that our hypothesis H:"the yellow stars have planets" is wrong.
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Figure 20: Representation of a situation in which the hypothesized rule is embedded within the
correct rule
Source:  J.  Klayman  and  Y.  Ha  (1987).  Confirmation,  disconfirmation,  and  information  in  hypothesis  testing.
Psychological Review, 94, 211-228.
This is also the case for the Wason experiment, since the hypothesized rule of the subjects 
(H:"increasing series of even number" or H:"increasing series of multiple of 2") was more strict of 
the actual rule (T:"increasing series of numbers"). Indeed, even in that case, once the subjects have 
done the hypothesis there was no way to reach the true rule by mean of a positive test since there 
would be a confirmation every time. 
The second case occurs when the set of the hypothesized rule and that of the true rule partially 
overlap (figure 21). For example, if the true rule is T:"the big stars have planets", we have that there
are the big yellow stars that have planets and the small yellow stars that have no planets, then a 
positive test could find that the hypothesized rule is wrong. And also a negative test has the 
possibility to debunk the hypothesis whenever we are pointing the telescope towards a big no-
yellow star.
Figure 21: Representation of a situation in which the hypothesized rule overlaps partially the correct
rule
Source:  J.  Klayman  and  Y.  Ha  (1987).  Confirmation,  disconfirmation,  and  information  in  hypothesis  testing.
Psychological Review, 94, 211-228.
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The third case is the opposite of the first, we have that the true rule is more strict of the 
hypothesized rule (figure 22). We can imagine a true rule T:"the big yellow stars have planets". In 
such case is the negative test that has no utility since the test would result always in an ambiguous 
verification. Pointing a no-yellow star we would see always that it has no planets since being yellow
it's a requirement to have planets. With a positive test, instead we would debunk our hypothesis 
whenever we are testing a small yellow star, that would result to have no planets and bring us at the 
conclusion that our rule was wrong. 
Figure 22: Representation of a situation in which the hypothesized rule surrounds the correct rule.
Source:  J.  Klayman  and  Y.  Ha  (1987).  Confirmation,  disconfirmation,  and  information  in  hypothesis  testing.
Psychological Review, 94, 211-228.
The fourth case occurs when our hypothesis is completely wrong and doesn't include any 
overlapping (figure 23). In the star-planets example, it could be T:"the green stars have planets", in 
such case both the positive test and the negative test could bring to falsification. Indeed, if we'd do a
positive test we will see suddenly that no yellow stars has planets, while with the negative test there 
is less efficiency since we will see that if we are pointing to a no-green star there is an ambiguous 
confirmation and only if we are pointing to a green star there is a falsification, but potentially it 
could serve our purpose as well.
The last case (figure 24) occurs when we have that the hypothesized rule and the actual rule is the 
same and we are right. Obviously, in such case, no test will result in a falsification and we will have
always confirms to our hypothesis.
We have seen how depending on the relation between the hypothesized rule and the actual rule, 
either the positive or negative test could bring to mistakes.  Then it would be wrong to define the 
positive test strategy as a mistaken strategy since in certain circumstances it could serve better than 
the negative one.  
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Figure 23: Representation of a situation in which the hypothesized rule and the correct rule are
disjoint.
Source:  J.  Klayman  and  Y.  Ha  (1987).  Confirmation,  disconfirmation,  and  information  in  hypothesis  testing.
Psychological Review, 94, 211-228.
Figure 24: Representation of the situation in which the hypothesized rule coincides with the correct
rule.
Source:  J.  Klayman  and  Y.  Ha  (1987).  Confirmation,  disconfirmation,  and  information  in  hypothesis  testing.
Psychological Review, 94, 211-228.
Obviously, we don't manage to know the relationship before having some results, since the 
relationship is what we are trying to find. Then we have no information to assess which test would 
be better to use in a specific situation. However, knowing the consequences of each case, we can 
decide which one use based on some characteristic of the phenomenon. For example, if we are more
concerned about an error rather than another. Indeed, if we want to assess if a man is ill, we will be 
more worried to state that a man is sane when actually he is ill, than stating that the man is ill when 
he is sane. Under these circumstances, we will invest more resources to seek among the sane men 
the sick one (negative test ) rather than seek the sane among the infirmed (positive test). On the 
contrary, we would invest in the positive test in the case we have to assess the guilt of a crime, since
it's generally preferable to let a criminal go free than lock in prison an innocent, so we will spend 
more energy seeking among the criminal an innocent (positive test) than seeking among the 
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innocent a criminal (negative test). If possible, it would be better to do both the tests, but it's not 
always recommended, especially in the cases with a too high number of elements to analyze. For 
example, even if we want to make sure that every sick person is treated, it would be too expensive 
to analyze every person in the country, looking for HIV-positive people (negative test). Rather, it'd 
be indicated to make sure that the persons supposed to have HIV, make a test to verify it, given that 
it would result a reasonable cost given the low amount of tests.
In the Wason experiment there was no information about which test perform so it's possible that 
the consumers would have chose a different approach if they would have more details about the 
consequences and characteristics of the experiment. So Wason probably highlighted only a 
preference for the positive test by the subjects on equal terms. However, we have seen that also the 
PTS which is not a biased strategy, could bring to an error that can be recognized as confirmation 
bias. 
In order to have a true confirmation bias (like imagined by Wason), we should have an alteration 
of the verification towards the belief, regardless of the relation between the rule hypothesized and 
the true rule. We may have some evidence of it in the dissonance theory literature, where the 
individuals tend to avoid the sources of information that are probable to question the decision made 
by them (Frey 1981). Another phenomenon may be the higher relevance of the confirming 
information compared with the disconfirming one,  when a certain attitude was present. For 
instance, the experiment of Gadenne and Oswald(1986) showed that the subjects of the experiment, 
that had to assess the relevance of the statement regarding the guilt or innocence of a man, who just 
have a prior belief about the guilty of the man tended to weights more the information supporting 
their own ideas.
In conclusion, we have seen how the confirmation bias can be the result of a diagnostic strategy 
like the PTS. And that the literature doesn't provide a unique definition of the phenomenon. There 
is, only, a common presence of a cognitive error that can sometimes be recognized as confirmation 
bias. Despite it, we will try to use the confirmation bias in order to explain the high inflation 
perception of 2002 in the next chapters, building up a model that takes up the confirmation 
ambiguity, like the PTS, to illustrate the effects of a possible presence of a confirmation bias. 
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6.1 Expectations origins
The fundamental condition so that the confirmation bias could be a possible explanation for the
abnormal consumers' perception, is that they start with the opinion that prices are increased. Since
the confirmation bias amplifies the existing belief but cannot explain how they are born.
The reasons for the pessimistic expectations of the consumers can be partially explained by the
phenomenon described in the previous chapters. For example, the frequency bias maybe led to a
negative expectation because the more frequently purchased products had increased of price, or
maybe the  consumers  noticed  more  the  larger  changes  of  prices  that,  being  negative,  led  to  a
negative perception about the overall price changes, or maybe the consumers were simply more
affected by the losses and have seen only the negative changes. Moreover, the media could have
affected the consumers' perception by leaving too much room to the euro-critics and the consumers'
associations,  or  could  have  used  a  kind  of  alarming  language  that  caused  plenty of  concerns.
Probably, the media have taken special care of the euro-related news, simply because of the great
importance of the phenomenon in the economy and in the country, but it has led to a focus of the
consumers' attention on the prices much more than in the past and encouraged them to notice each
singular increase of price.
Another possible explanation could come from the political dynamics among the parties of the
country. We are wondering if it could be possible that some political factions has fueled the belief of
an increase of the prices, in order to obtain some advantage in terms of popular support. If that's the
case, this phenomenon could have pushed the population to partially believe in the price increases
as consequence of wrongful information provided by the parties. We can think that the consumers
make a sort of average of the politicians' statement in order to obtain an estimate of the inflation
rate, so in a case where a party provides a wrongful information, there is also a biased perception
among the population. Especially, for the supporters of the party fueling the belief. 
Imagine that a voter chooses who vote based only on the presence or not of the increases of prices
caused by the euro, rewarding the governing party in the case of no increase prices and punish him
if the increases occur. We will call Alpha the governing party and Beta the opposition party. We can
imagine also that the consumer infers the outcome of the euro changeover by the statement of the
two parties. We have, then, that: 
 If the parties agree the voter believes them;
 If the parties disagree the voter will get confused and will give a random vote.
We can summarize the possibilities by mean of a game representation in the figure 25.
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Figure 25: Representation of the game and payoff of the parties
Source: personal elaboration
From this representation, we can note how Alpha has a clear advantage to state that the euro has
not caused price increases and that everything has gone without problem. On the contrary, the party
Beta has a clear advantage to state that actually the prices have increased, since if he doesn't say that
would be equivalent to donate a vote to the opponent. We can infer from the game that there is
always a part of the politicians that have the incentive to state there was a price increase and that it
was caused by the euro changeover, regardless of fact that it is true or not. And, on the other hand,
there  is  always  someone  that  has  incentive  to  say that  the  prices  were  stable,  even  if  they've
increased.
But, is it what happened in Italy? It's possible that some party led the consumers to believe that the
prices have increased? Regarding the situation in Italy at that time, the political landscape involved
a few parties gathered in  two big coalitions,  the right  coalition that  was the majority and was
leading the government, and the left coalition at the opposition. Such situation derived by the recent
elections held on 2001, after different years of left-wing's government that was the greater supporter
of  the  monetary union and of  the  various  integration  proceedings  of  the  European economies.
Before 2002, the right parties were cautious and slightly critics about the euro and his effects on the
economy,  while  the  lefts  were,  along  with  the  general  feeling  of  the  population,  excited  and
optimistic.
Later, after the euro introduction, the general optimism of the population was gradually replaced
by dissatisfaction about the euro and by the complaints about the prices increase, that reached the
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pinnacle in the summer season. At the same time, the left-wing parties started to accuse the majority
to not control the sellers' behavior and to not monitoring the price changes.
"Therefore the increases are not due to the introduction of the euro but to the lack of government control. The euro
was not the cause, but the opportunity to exercise illegitimate and surprisingly uncontrolled increases"
Translation of: Romano Prodi, interview to La Reppublica, 31/12/2002
The right-wing parties kept a practical position for a long period after the changeover, reassuring
that  the  inflation  was  very  low,  but  also  warning  the  consumers  to  pay  attention  to  potential
increases and inviting them to change shops if the prices rose. Only later, the right parties came
back to support the critics of the euro, once the pressures about the euro inflation from the unions
lessened.
"... Italian families have suffered an increase. And therefore, a decrease in their purchasing power, but this is due to the
introduction of the euro, which I remember was not decided by this government but was decided by the previous 
governments."
Translation of: Silvio Berlusconi End of year press conference, 20/12/2003
Probably, the choice to indulge the population's feeling give to every party more communicative
advantages than insist to claim that the prices have not had particular increases. However, from the
consumers' point of view, it was a confirmation that their belief was right and probably worsened
the general opinion.
In conclusion, it's unlikely that the political discussion created the perceptions of an increase of
prices, given the delay on the topic, but it is realistic to think that the reciprocal accusations could
have enhanced the worries of the consumers.  And in addition to that, the other factors like the
frequency bias, the loss aversion, and the media effects, could altogether have built up the sentiment
of pessimism on the topic.
6.2 The model
In general, we expect that a rational consumer, that tries to estimates the inflation rate, performs an
adequate analysis of the prices and, in the end, will reach an unbiased estimate. However, we have
seen how the individuals could make erroneous estimate also with a valid strategy as the positive
test (PTS), thanks to the ambiguous verification that it's mistaken for a valid confirmation of the
beliefs  by  the  consumers.  Also  the  model  proposed  here  tries  to  catch  the  phenomenon  of
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ambiguous verification, assuming that the consumer uses a confirmation strategy, in a certain way
similar to the PTS, in order to verify his beliefs about an increase of prices.
First of all, we assume that the consumer don't know the price level in the new currency, but have
an expectancy of it (p0). After the changeover, the consumer, in order to know the prices level, visit
the closer shop to see if his expectation is correct or not, and he notes down the first price he sees
(p).  Once he has  done it,  the consumer will  believe his  expectancy is  correct  if  the price p is
sufficiently close to his expectation p0 (E1). Otherwise, if the price is too far from the expectation the
consumer will  realize that his  expectation is  unrealistic  and that  it  is  wrong, and then,  he will
perform a thorough analysis that will bring him to the true value of inflation rate (p*). 
We will take one representative product in order to keep the model as simple as possible, but
obviously, we can apply the concepts to every singular product of the market as well as all the
aggregate.
In order to determine the consumer's expectation after the test (p1), we have that the consumer has
a probability P(E1) to draw a price near his expectation  p0 and confirm it (where E1  is the event:
draw a price that confirms the consumer's expectation), and a probability of 1-P(E1) to draw a price
far from the expectation that debunks it, and that brings the consumer to know the real price level
p*.
The point now is to assess the expected perceived level of prices E(P1). It will be the results of
consumers' test approach described above, and it depends on: the expectancy of the consumer, the
actual level of price and the probability that the consumer see in the shop a price near enough to the
expectancy to supports his hypothesis.
We can imagine the test performed by the consumer as a test hypothesis on his expectancy. Since it
can summarize different aspect of our assumed situation, and could be taken as the reflection of the
preference of the consumer for his belief, especially when we consider the classic test based on the
first type of error.
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E (P1)= p0 P (E1)+ p*(1−P (E1))
{p1=p0 P (E 1 )p1=p* 1−P (E1)
In this  case we have three random variable:  the real  prices  P* (  p*,  σ*2)  that  include all  the
different prices in the market across the shops, from which the consumer draws the prices to test the
hypothesis; the expected prices distribution P0  ( p0  , σ02), since we assume that the consumer has a
certain expectation but also that he knows there are different prices across the shops for a certain
product and P1 that is the expectation of the consumer after the test. We have that: if the consumer
draws from P* a price p that confirms the hypothesis, the ex-post belief will be the random variable
P1=P0( p0 , σ02), and if the price p doesn't confirm the hypothesis, P1= P* ( p*, σ*2). 
Figure 26: Representation of a hypothesis testing on expectation price
Source: personal elaboration
For simplicity we assume that both the distributions P* ( p*, σ*) and P0( p0  , σ0) are normally
distributed . Moreover, we can normalize and assume p* = 0 in order to see only the effect of the
bias. Then we can obtain the interval of confidence of the consumer's expectation test, namely the
range of prices able to confirm the consumer's expectation: IC= p0 ± z1-α/2 σ0.
We can, then, define the test as:
 H0: p1 = p0             If p  I. C. of P∈ 0   
 H1: p1 = p*       If p  I. C. of P∉ 0    
Translating the variables in the normalized form they become:
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z p *=0 z Po=p0− p * z= p−p *
z Inf.limit=z Po−z1−ασPo zUpp.limit=z Po+z1−ασPo
In order to calculate the probability to accept the hypothesis, we have to calculate the value of the
area under the P* density functions, between the upper and lower limits of the I.C. range of H0 (the
green  area  of  figure  26),  that  represent  the  probability  to  draw  a  price  that  will  confirm  the
expectation of the consumer. It is obtained by the formula:
That can transformed in:
From  this  formulation,  we  can  know  how  the  different  variables  affect  the  probability  of
acceptance. In particular, we have that the probability that the consumer will confirm his hypothesis
is inversely proportional to the expectation (p0). In other words further is the expectation of the
consumer from the real prices mean, less is the probability that it will be verified.
We have, after, the variability of the expected prices distribution σ0 , that is directly proportional to
the probability of acceptance. Indeed is logic that a consumer who believes the distribution of prices
is large is not willing to admit he is wrong unless he draws a very distant price. If it happens to draw
a closer price the consumer will attribute the draw to the variance of the prices in the market and go
on believing that the average of the prices is equal to his expectation.
Eventually, we have the variability of the real prices σ*, that has a more ambiguous relationship
with the probability of acceptance. Indeed, if the expectation is close to the real mean a higher
variance of the prices bring to a less probability of acceptance.  And, on the other  hand, if  the
expectation is relatively distant from the actual mean, increasing the variance of the real prices has a
different effect depending on the value. If we have a relatively low variance it would be difficult
that  the  consumer  draws  a  price  able  to  confirm his  hypothesis,  and  the  same happens  if  the
variance is extremely high. The maximum of the probability of acceptance would be somewhere in
the middle, where the variance of the real prices let the drawing of a confirming price possible but it
doesn't include a lot of prices more. 
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P ( E1 )=∫p0−z1−ασP0P0+ z1−ασP0 1σP *√2π e
−
( p− p * )2
2σP *
2
P ( E1 )=
1
2 [erf ( p0+z1−ασPo)√2σP* −erf ( p0−z1−ασPo)√2σP* ]
6.2.1 Comparative statics
In order to see better the effects of the expectations on the probability of acceptance and on the
perception,  imagine  that  a  consumer  wants  to  verify  the  price  of  the  t-shirts  after  the  euro
changeover.  Assume that  the  t-shirts  are  sold  by different  shops  with  different  prices,  with  an
average  price  of  10€  and  a  standard  deviation  of  the  distribution  prices  of  1€.  Similarly,  the
consumer also supposes the standard deviation of the prices to be 1€. Moreover, knowing that even
if his hypothesis was right he could draw prices different from it, he decides to assume a confidence
level of 95% for the test.
Figure 27: Representation of the probability of acceptance depending on the expectation
Source: personal elaboration
In  figure  27,  we  can  see  the  impact  of  expectation  on  the  probability  that  the  beliefs  were
confirmed and on the perceived level of prices. In this case, the expectation that maximizes the
expected value of the perceived inflation is between 1,5 and 2. In particular, it is p0=1,645 which
corresponds to an expected value of E(P1)= 1,025. Generalizing to all the population, it'd mean that
in the worst scenario the consumers expect the price to be 11,645€, and after the test, the 62,31% of
consumers don't change such belief, while the other 37,69% of the consumers have understood that
the average price is 10€.
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If  the  consumer  expects  a  price  higher  than  11,645€,  then  the  probability  of  confirming  the
expectation will reduce so much that would be not offset by the higher perception of whom still
confirm the expectation,  and then it  would decrease the expected value of the perceived price.
Similarly, if the expectation would be less than 11,645€ the higher number of people that confirm a
higher hypothesis  would not offset  the fact that  the consumer's  hypothesis  is  closer to the real
average than before. Now having seen that, we can state that: at low expectations, there is a high
number of consumers that will believe the prices are "slightly increase", while at high expectations
there are a few consumers that believe the prices are "risen a lot". 
Should  be  clear  now, that  is  not  possible  have  a  very high  impact  of  the  expectation  on  the
perceived  prices  of  the  consumers  simply  with  a  high  expectation.  It  is  needed  that  also  the
probability that the consumers accept their belief is high so that the tests can confirm the wrong
expectation more often.
Figure 28: Representation of the probability of acceptance and the impact, depending on the
expected variability σ0
Source: personal elaboration
One possibility in order to have a high probability of acceptance could be that the consumer thinks
that the variability (σ0) of the prices is high. Indeed, a higher variance leads to a lower number of
prices able to disconfirm the belief (figure 28). In the previous example, if the consumer thinks that
the standard deviation of the t-shirts prices is σ0 =3€ with an expectation price of p0  =3€, and he
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draws a price of p = 6€, then he will ascribe the price to be fault of the variability and he will not
change his mind. On the contrary, if the consumer in the same situation, think that the standard
deviation of the t-shirts prices is 0,50€, then he will conclude that is unlikely that the price can be
explained by the variability, and that he's wrong.
As regards the variability of the real prices (σ*), we have two different behaviors depending on the
distance of the expectation from the real mean. In the case where the expectation is closer, we can
see the graph in figure 29, which shows that there is an inversely proportional relationship between
the actual prices' standard deviation and the expected value of the perceived prices for relatively
low expectations (p0=1 in this case). The maximum of the expected perception is at σ*=0, and every
increase in the variance lead to a lower impact on the perceptions. Intuitively if σ*=0 all the prices
in the market are equals, so if this unique price is near the expectation (namely inside the range of
acceptance), the price will always confirm it. As regards the relationship with the expectation p0 ,
the maximum effect is 1€ added up to the real price since the expectation is assumed to be 1€ more,
but if the expectation would be 1.50€ higher than the real price it would lead to a maximum effect
of 1.50€. As regards the tail of the function, it reflects the fact that with a higher variance there are
more prices falling far from the mean p* and since the expectation p0  is, in this case, close to it, it
means a higher number of prices falling outside the range of acceptance. 
Figure 29: Representation of the probability of acceptance and the impact, depending on the
expected variability σ*, in the case of an low expectation
Source: personal elaboration
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The second case, in the graph in figure 30, we have that if the consumer has a high expectation
there is a different behavior by the function. It is due to the fact that if the expectation is far from
the real price level and we increase the prices' variance, there is a higher probability to draw a price
able to confirm a far expectation, but going on increasing the variance we will reach a point where
our probability of acceptance result to have nothing to gain by a higher variance, since would be
more difficult draw in a greater pool a price able to make accept the expectation. Indeed, if we think
to the extreme case, where the variance is infinite, we have zero probability to draw a price inside
the acceptance range because there is infinite prices.
Figure 30: Representation of the probability of acceptance and the impact, depending on the
expected variability σ*, in the case of an high expectation
Source: personal elaboration 
We can note  that  in  both  the  cases,  a  contraction  of  the  prices  variability  could  increase  the
expected value of the perceived prices if we have a relatively high variance. Such phenomenon is
interesting since it seems that in some countries, the euro could have led to a concentration of the
prices, especially, where the exchange between the euro and new currency was high. The reason is
that it caused a reduction of the possibles attractive prices in the various bands. An example of it, in
Italy,  is  250gr ground coffee which prices were, before the euro,  scattered among 27 attractive
prices, while after the changeover they had reduced to 14 (Guido G. 2002), causing probably a
prices concentration in such attractive prices that could have increased the probability of a mistake
by the consumers respect to the case where the variance was higher. 
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Would be interesting know the changes of variability before and after the changeover for all the
product's prices, in order to know in which case we are, and get to know if the variance of prices
could be a significant factor on the 2002's price perception. But we leave to other studies the task to
analyze if that's the case. 
 The confidence level,  represented in  figure 31,  is  the less interesting variable.  Briefly,  if  the
confidence  level  of  test  increases,  the  probability of  acceptance  and the  impact  of  the  starting
expectation on the expected perceived prices are higher,  since it  would mean being more strict
about the prices able to debunk the expectations. It is similar to the increase of the variance of the
expectation  σ0 , since both provide a larger I. C. range, and then a higher number of prices that
confirm the hypothesis. In the extreme case (confidence level= 100%) it would mean that there is
not price able to debunk the expectation and that the consumer is uncompromising about changing
his mind. The effect on the impact on the perception would derive directly by the expectations, so if
the consumer expects a price of p0=150€ for a t-shirt, the percived price after the test would be
p1=150€, without exception.
Figure 31: Representation of the probability of acceptance and the impact, depending on the
confidence level
Source: personal elaboration 
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6.2.2 Sample size
Contrary to what might be though, even if the consumers want to use a great number of samples,
the  confirmation  bias  still  affects  the  perceptions.  As we can  see  in  figure  32,  the  fact  that  a
consumer  uses  more  than  one  price  to  verify  his  hypothesis  change  the  relation  among  the
expectation and probability of acceptance; and then also the expected value of the perceptions. It,
actually,  increases  the  chances  that  a  "low"  expectation  will  be  confirmed,  but  reduces  the
probability of acceptance for the further expectations.
Figure 32: Representation of the probability of acceptance and the expected value of perceived
prices with different sample's sizes
Source: personal elaboration
In order to understand that, just imagine the extreme case where the consumer considers a sample
of all the prices in the market, with the sample mean exactly equals to the average of the real prices.
In this case, if the mean is inside the interval of acceptance the consumer will confirm his belief for
sure because there is  no room for mistakes,  whereas if  it  is  outside the range the belief  of the
consumer will be, as sure as the other case, debunked. In the graph 26 such situation would be
represented by a shrinkage of the actual price distribution caused by the reduction of the sample's
standard deviation, until the point where it will be (in the extreme case) a unique point. 
This phenomenon is interesting since it affects also the consumers that perform, from their point of
view,  an  analysis  statistically  valid.  And  it  could  explain  why  also  the  people  with  a  high
educational level and the discerning consumers fell into the trap of the euro-inflation beliefs.
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6.2.3 Model over time and rational behavior
So far, the model built doesn't provide any change after a consumer has done the test over his
hypothesis confirming it, however is not realistic thinking that the consumer won't have any further
questions about his belief. If we assume that the consumer keeps making tests about his expectation
with a certain frequency, it leads to a decreasing probability that he will keep his starting beliefs
over time. 
In order to see it, we can use the example of the t-shirt used in the previous chapters and see in the
figure 33 what happen to the probability of acceptance with a certain testing frequency.
Figure 33: Representation of the probability of acceptance over time
Source: personal elaboration
We can see how the probability decrease and tends to 0 as time goes by, and with it also the
expected  value  of  the  perceptions  reduces.  After  12  months  we  have  that  the  probability  that
someone  still  believes  in  his  expectation  is  about  the  9% with  monthly  tests,  about  1% with
biweekly tests and about the 0% with a test every week. In this particular case, we can say that,
since we have a 10% difference between the expected inflation rate and the real one, the impact of
the confirmation bias on the perceived inflation is equal, after 12 months, respectively, to the 0.9%,
0.1% and 0%. These results maybe don't seem to be enough to explain the perception of the 2002,
but we have to remember that, we assume that the tests are strictly fixed over time and maybe it's
not  case,  since  probably  the  tests  have  been  done  for  the  major  part  immediately  after  the
changeover or as soon as the consumer see for the first time the product after it. Moreover, we
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assume that the consumer sees all the products' prices the day after the changeover, but it's not
realistic. And if the consumer sees for the first time the price of a product six months after the
changeover,  that's  when  the  impact  on  perception  occurs.  Moreover,  the  expectation  of  the
consumer can be affected by exogenous factors that make it increase or decrease at any time.
Obviously, the frequencies showed are completely arbitrary, and there is no reason why the tests
couldn't  be  daily  or  even  more  frequent.  In  these  cases,  is  evident  that  the  impact  of  the
confirmation bias is negligible since it came to zero too fast.
In  order  to  estimate  the  real  frequency,  we  could  consider  the  purchasing  frequency  of  the
products,  but  we would  not  be  sure that  the  consumers  perceive  the  real  prices  in  a  currency
changeover context, or that the consumer pays attention to the price every time that he purchases
something testing his beliefs. On this topic would be useful some more information over when the
consumers mend their ways, and when they are actually aware of the prices.
If we link up to the sample size topic in the previous chapter, we can say that in a situation where
the sample size is high an high expectation will be quickly debunked by the tests, since it's unlikely
that  some  sample  mean  would  be  enough  "extreme"  to  confirm  the  hypothesis.  Instead,  the
relatively low expectations will persist for a  longer time.
Our model provides that the consumer adopts a binary strategy: “or the consumer has the reason or
not”. And in order to do that, we have seen that he considers a range of prices that confirm his
hypothesis, while the other prices debunk him. The question coming is: what else he can do? Which
is the rational behavior? For this question there are different answers since there is more than one
rational behavior. One of them could be approaching the price level assessment without expectation,
evaluating  empirically  the  inflation  by  means  of  sampling.  Another  rational  strategy could  be
consider different hypothesis and verify them independently from each other in order to identify the
more realistic one. From the point of view of the government, the best behavior of the consumers
would be that they test first the official indices value. In that case, the consumers' estimate would be
just correct and wouldn't be any significant bias. But seeing from the consumer point of view, there
is no reason to think that the government couldn't modify the data for his purpose, and he wants to
make an estimation of his own to be sure his perception fits the official indices. 
Probably  the  most  rational  behavior  that  the  consumer  can  perform is  an  adjustment  of  the
expectation based on the price drawn. If, for example, he does an average between his expectation
and the price drawn every time, he would reach the real price level (or get close to it) faster than in
our model. Taking the t-shirt example we can see in figure 34 both our model behavior and the
adjustment case (where the consumer doesn't make a test but simply update the expectation with a
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simple  average  between the  expectation  and the  new price  drawn).  Seeing that  the  ambiguous
confirmation effect of our model shows a higher impact of the expectation over the perceived prices
with higher value all along the period. Obviously is not always the case, it is true as far as the
probability of acceptance is higher of the 50%. Indeed, with a lower probability of acceptance, there
would be a major impact by the adjustment process.
Figure 34: Comparison of the model with the adjustment process
Source: personal elaboration
6.2.4 Positive test strategy 
Our model has both some differences and similarities respect the PTS. As regards the differences,
the sets of the PTS were clearly defined, but now only the target set (I.C.) is defined while the other
set P* is virtually all the prices present in the market even if they have a different probability to be
drawn. Moreover our purpose it's not identify the logic of the sets' definition, but it is find out what
is the price that better summarized the prices of the market. 
Even if our model is fundamentally different from the classic PTS, we have also some similarities.
Indeed, in figure 35, we can see how the cases of the PTS can reappear also in our model. Here, we
have similar cases to the PTS with the difference that the case creating more problem is the second
one (b), while in the examples of Klayman and Ha the problems occurred in the case (a). It is due to
the fact that we are testing an item drawn from the real prices, while in the PTS we have that the
item to be tested is provided by our rule. But obviously, in our model, we have no power to chose
the item to be tested. For the rest we have one to one the same cases and the consequent problems
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coming from the overlapping of the sets/functions. What before was an ambiguous verification of
the rule now is the possible no-exclusion of a wrong hypothesis or expectation. 
At a conceptual level there is an intrinsic component of positive test inside the classic hypothesis
testing  method  that  doesn't  provide  an  adjustment  of  the  mean,  but  only  a  confirmation  of  a
disconfirmation of the hypothesis. In fact, we focus our test on the expectation similarly to how the
PTS focus the test on the hypothesized rule.
Figure 35: The cases of the model and the positive test strategy
Source: personal elaboration
6.2.5 Critics and limitations
Even  if  this  model  seems  to  explain  well  what  happened  during  the  euro  changeover  it  has
different limits, that could prevent it to be a valid explanation of 2002's perceptions.
First of all, it's unlikely that a consumer changes his mind if he tests a price that is greater of his
expectation, indeed it's probable that it further increases the starting consumer's beliefs. At the same
time, it's not unrealistic that the consumer discards his expectation if he understands that he knows
nothing about the distribution of the prices, and then our assumption still retains some truth.
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It's hard to believe that a consumer will get to know the real prices level once he debunked his
expectation. An alternative possibility is that the average consumer, after the disconfirmation of his
hypothesis,  proceeds  to  a  gradual  decrease in  his  expectation until  the moment he confirms it.
However, it's chosen to assume that the consumer gets to know the real price level for three reasons:
 The consumer that sees debunked his expectation could give more credibility to the official
estimates;
 If  the  consumer  wants  to  perform  his  own  estimation  gathering  a  simple  sample,  the
expected  value  of  the  sample  mean  would  be  presumably  equal  to  the  official  indices
estimates;
 This approach provides more cautious estimates of the phenomenon respect any other one
else.
It's  hard  that  a  consumer  performing  a  proper  analysis  doesn't  notice  that  the  expectation  is
systematically higher than the prices tested, especially true when we have a series of tests and less
important when we are talking of only one or two tests. It highlights also the lack of some scale of
the credibility of the beliefs. Indeed, in the model, we have that the consumer accepts or rejects the
hypothesis, but would be logic thinking that the consumer trusts more his hypothesis when accepted
with a price close to the belief than when accepted by a price far from it.
It  is  possible  that  a  consumer  may  exclude  some  price  outside  of  his  range  of  acceptance
recognizing it as an outsider. That would be the classic confirmation bias in his broader definition,
but is not a problem since if it'd be true, the model will explain in a great manner the perceived
inflation.
One of  the  more  important  assumptions  of  the  model  is  that  it  provides  a  clear  and  defined
expectation by the consumer, with a certain variance and mean, in addition to a rigid confidence
level. It is unlikely that the consumer has a so clear idea of his expectations, and even if he has, it's
highly  probable  that  such  variables  change  depending  on  the  current  situation.  Moreover,  the
distributions  of  the  prices  and  the  expectations  could  be  better  summarized  by  a  distribution
different  than  the  normal  one,  with  different  results  in  terms  of  probability  of  acceptance  and
expected impact on the consumers' perceptions.
Another  great  problem  comes  by  the  impossibility  to  verify  the  phenomenon,  indeed  an
experiment that would try to confirm it  should consider separately the expectation of the price
increase and the confirmation of it, and this would be troublesome since it's hard to distinguish
which case the consumer is talking when it is asked what are his opinion about the prices. Indeed
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we don't know if the Isae data caught the first or later one, and in both cases, we would lack the
other one to build up a verification experiment.
Despite  these  limits,  the  model  still  have,  theoretically,  some level  of  capability  to  explain  a
possible presence of the confirmation bias in the abnormal increased of perceived prices after the
euro changeover, since explanatory of a verification method that could have turned the expectations
of the consumers in concrete beliefs, or at least strengthened the phenomenon of the high perceived
inflation together with the others factors.
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7. CONCLUSIONS
In  this  work,  we  have  presented  the  problem of  the  high  inflation  perception  after  the  euro
changeover. We have seen that the official data were not able to explain the perceptions as may do
the non-official ones, that reported higher rates. But we have seen also that both the first and, a lot
more, the second have different limits as statistical instrument. After, we reported the studies about
the impact of the rounding up effects, that together with the official data give us a relative safety
about the stability of prices at the time of the changeover.
Given that, we went on illustrating the data about the perceptions index and treating the literature
about the possible psychological reasons that could affect the consumers' perceptions. Among them,
the  subjectivity  of  the  inflation  suffered,  the  tendency  to  overestimate  the  importance  of  the
frequently purchased product, the effect of the loss aversion and of the high-value changes, as well
as the media influence. Eventually finding that no one of them could be considered for sure the
principal cause of the abnormal perceptions.
In the last part of the work, we proposed the confirmation bias as another factor that can be added
to  the  list  of  the  reasons  why  the  consumers  had  wrong  perceptions.  We  explained  that  the
consumers might expect an increase of the inflation rate thanks to the others factors listed above and
some grade of denying of the official data by the politic environment, and that, as cause of it, a sort
of confirmation bias could have taken place. 
Then, we built up our model using the hypothesis test framework, for which the consumers accept
their expectation if they see a price near to it, and accept the official data to be true once they draw a
price far from the expectation. We went on with the analysis of the different variables and their
effect on the perceptions. Of particular interest the sample size. We found that also high samples
size don't always help to prevent the bias, and in the case of relatively low expectation, a high
sample size gets a worse impact. Explaining why also the high degree consumers, that may have
performed a deeper analysis, have perceived an high inflation. 
In the end, our model showed that the ambiguity confirmation, deriving from the prices close to
the consumers' ideas, could have stretched the time the consumers took to absorb a wrong starting
expectation, explaining why they believed it for such long period. 
Like the other possible reasons our model doesn't definitively confirm that is the confirmation bias
the origin of the discrepancy between the real data and the perceptions. Since the confirmation bias
itself,  needs the presence of other factors. In fact, also in the case where the effect of the bias
explains the perceptions of 2002, the starting expectation would remain unanswered. Eventually,
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probably there  was no  a  unique  reason that  caused the  phenomenon,  but  different  factors  that
reinforced each other and the confirmation bias could be one of them. 
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